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The Ultimatum Game examines the relationship between profit maximization and fairness in our decision making 
process. The setup: two players, a proposer and a responder divide an amount of money between them. The 
predicted outcome is a result where the proposer offers $1 to the responder and keeps the rest with the responder 
accepting the offer. The game introduces that monetary gain may not be the only force behind people’s decision 
making process while introducing the ideas of fairness and equality. The game results seem to disprove the theory 
that people behave rationally, or economically speaking in their own self-interest.  
 
 
From childhood, the principle of fairness to others has been instilled in us through learning to share our toys or 
wait our turn in line. However, economics assumes that individuals are homo economicus (self-interested and 
rational) and frequently overlook the role of fairness in market transactions. For example: Suppose that two friends 
find a $100 dollar bill on the street. How will the friends divide that money? Friend 1 picks the bill up (and therefore 
is in possession of it), and he wants to play “finders keepers” with a split of $99 to $1. Friend 2 has the option of 
accepting Friend 1’s offer of $1 or taking the bill to the police station to report it as found and receive $0. The homo 
economicus suggests that Friend 2 should accept the $1 because rejecting it leads to a zero payoff.  However, we 
find that this game is unlikely to play out in the manner described. This raises the question, why doesn’t Friend 2 
accept a smaller payoff compared to turning the bill in for a zero payoff.  
The above game is a bargaining game called the Ultimatum Game. The game was introduced by Guth, 
Schmittberger, & Schwarze (1982) to discuss the proposed division of a pool of money that is received by one 
individual to divide between the two players. One individual receives the pool of money and proposes payoffs by 
demanding the largest portion of the pie that will result in acceptance by the respondent.  The respondent maximizes 
payoffs by accepting any proposer demand that results in a payoff above zero for the respondent. Therefore, 
economists predict that proposer will keep all but just $1, which will go to the responder, and the responder will 
accept.   
The Nash equilibrium is the ultimate rational decision, but in practice, players rarely reach the Nash. More 
formally defined, the Nash equilibrium is an outcome where each participant makes the best decision possible based 
on the decisions made by the other participants. The Nash equilibrium incorporates not only the choices made by the 
individual but also the strategic choices made by another rational player. The question then is what motivates 
players to play the game in an irrational manner? One possibility is that players are motivated by preferences for 
equality. Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher (2008) found that players respond not just to the distributive results, but also to 
the degree of equality underlying the proposer’s intentions. This leads to different acceptance rates of identical 
offers; dependent upon both the proposer’s and receiver’s perceived level of fairness. Guth, Huck, & Muller (2001) 
examined whether fair offers were accepted less often when the splits were near equal than when they were exactly 
equal. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) examined ultimatum game experiments testing the influence of social 
comparisons on behavior. They found that when players compared their lot to that of others, the distance between 
the offer and the norm (the equitable split) decreased. More specifically, the social comparison caused players to 
focus on the norm.     
When viewed in the context of the morality of equality, the ultimatum game becomes one in which people may 
not always behave rationally. This assumption examines only the monetary payoffs from the exercise. Various other 
studies (Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Zamir, 2001; Sobel, 2005; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006) found that money maximization 
may not be the sole motivating factor in the game, but other social payoffs such as a fairer outcome may provide a 
benefit to the participants. Therefore, the solution may still hold that the participants are maximizing utility but not 
solely through conventional monetary payoffs. As such, rational behavior would still be that which maximizes 
payoffs, but payoffs may be measured in terms of both monetary values and the utility derived from maximizing the 
payoffs to all players.   
Equality preferences allow us to begin the discussion of whether playing the game repeatedly with the same 
opponent alters player behavior. If players play based on a preference toward equality, then having a fixed opponent 
should increase the likelihood of reaching a more equitable split because through the course of the treatment, 
proposers learn what responders will accept and adjust their offers accordingly. Nowak, Page, & Sigmund (2000) 
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found that when proposers were given information about the offers accepted by the respondents, the result was a 
gradual move away from Nash and toward equitable splits.       
This paper provides an outline for professors to introduce the game into their classroom and the results that 
should be obtained from the exercise. The four remaining sections are as follows: The next section details the design 
of the classroom exercise and how aspects of fairness can be incorporated. The following section details the results 




The Ultimatum Game (along with other classroom exercises) has been provided to instructors by the Veconlab 
from the University of Virginia through a NSF grant (VeconLab, 2005). The website allows instructors to create a 
free account to design their exercise. We have conducted the exercise using a variety of common setups from 
multiple classes to provide you with examples that may best fit your classroom. Each exercise was conducted using 
three ten-round sections that allow the instructor to illustrate various topics for discussion (See Table 1 for a 
breakdown of the exercises). For the first exercise, we began the first ten-round section with a slight variation of the 
ultimatum game, the dictator game. The dictator game differs from the ultimatum game in that the responder has no 
decision to accept or reject the proposal. Therefore, it allows discussion on how participants will behave with no 
checks on their behavior. The second ten-round section was the standard ultimatum treatment with the pool of 
money (pie) fixed at $10. The pairing of opponents was random. In the third section, we expanded the pie size to 
$20 with all parameters being equivalent. In the second exercise, all three treatments were the standard Ultimatum 
design.  We differed these ten-round treatments by varying the pie size and the method of pairing the participants 
from random to fixed. 
   
Table 1: Exercise Set-Ups 
 
 Game Setup Pie Size Matching 
Exercise 1    
First Ten Rounds Dictator Game $10 Random 
Second Ten Rounds Ultimatum Game $10 Random 
Third Ten Rounds Ultimatum Game $20 Random 
Exercise 2    
First Ten Rounds Ultimatum Game $10 Random 
Second Ten Rounds Ultimatum Game $20 Random 
Third Ten Rounds Ultimatum Game $20 Fixed 
 
The issue of how to mimic actual behavior by the students to reflect “accurate” outcomes is a controversial one.   
Researchers have found that students behave differently when using “hypothetical” payoffs than when there is some 
tangible benefit to the students. These hypothetical earnings may cause students to be disinterested or create a 
“noisy” set of data, which may not be useful for discussion (Dickinson, 2002). Therefore, instructors typically use 
one of two methods to encourage “cleaner” results. First, instructors may convert dollars from the exercise into 
classroom or extra-credit points. Second, instructors can pay either the entire amount of the earnings or a portion of 
the earnings in cash. There is a variety of ways to accomplish this payment setup. The instructor may pay all 
students or randomly select one student from the class. Each payment option has costs that each instructor must 
weigh in deciding the payoff from the exercise. 
With the use of the website, the process is streamlined from the old system of physically writing the offers out 
and redistributing through the class to the respondents and then back. The website allows for easy access for the 
students to see a history of their offers and the acceptance/rejection of those offers. The entire process (30 rounds) of 
the exercise can be done in a 50-minute class period. After the exercise is over, the average offers and rejection 




A variety of topics can be introduced through this game. From a Principles of Microeconomics class, we have 
provided an example of results, typical to other experiments done using this game. 
 Topic 1: Will Proposers capture more monetary payoffs in the dictator games than in the standard 
Ultimatum game? In the dictator game, proposers are not constrained by the lack of fairness shown to the 
respondents. The discussion revolves around proposers being torn between rationality and equality. The results show 
students that people in the role of dictators may utilize that power to extract from helpless respondents. The Nash 
Equilibrium for how the proposer should behave in a dictator game is to keep all the pie, while in the ultimatum 
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game the proposer should keep all but $1. The dictator does not have the possibility of zero payout due to rejection, 
therefore proposers should be motivated by maximizing payoffs, but social norms still may alter their preferences. 
From the first exercise, Table 2 details the number of offers for each proposer demand in the exercise. It also 
provides the rejection rates. 
 
Table 2: Proposer Demands and Rejections in the Dictator/Ultimatum Game for Exercise 1 
 
Amount of the  Proposer Demand Dictator Offers Ultimatum Offers Rejections 
0 3 1 0/1(0%) 
5 47 105 2/105 (1.9%) 
6 1 5 2/5 (40%) 
7 1 6 2/6 (33%) 
8 12 4 3/4 (75%) 
9 9 3 3/3 (100%) 
10 57 6 6/6(100%) 
 
 From Table 2, we can see the various demands made by the proposers for their portion of the pie. Table 2 shows 
distinct differences in the frequency distribution of proposer demands between the Dictator and Ultimatum rounds.  
In the Dictator treatment, 44% of proposers demanded the Nash equilibrium offer, compared to 36% who demanded 
the equitable split. Contrast that with the Ultimatum treatment in which only 2% demanded the respective Nash 
equilibrium offer of 9 compared with 81% who demanded the equitable split. A look at the rejection rates for the 
Ultimatum treatment provides insight into why proposers behaved so differently between the two treatments. When 
respondents were able to influence proposer behavior in the Ultimatum treatment, which they did at a rejection rate 
of 75-100% for unfair and near unfair offers, proposers’ sense of fairness took over, and the result was a less than 
2% rejection rate for fair offers. So, when players faced the possibility of zero payoffs resulting from rejection of 
inequitable demands, their behavior may have been based much more on equality than on rationality. Table 3 shows 
the mean proposer demand in the dictator game was higher than that of the small pie ultimatum game and was 
significant at the 1% level.    
 
Table 3: Mean payoffs for the dictator and small pie ultimatum games 
 
Mean Proposer Demand 
Dictator Game 
Mean Proposer Demand 
Small Pie Ultimatum Game 
t-value Observations 
7.65 5.51 11.90 260 
 
 An interesting finding in this exercise was that only 4 times did the proposers in 20 rounds offer to take no part 
of the pie. In the Dictator game, the same person in rounds 9 and 10 offered to take $0 of the $10 and give it to their 
partner. The individual who did not take any part of the pie in Rounds 9 and 10 had taken $10 in the previous eight 
rounds. Thus, this finding leaves to interpretation the motive for such a drastic change in behavior, which may have 
been caused by emotions such as shame or guilt. In addition, the dictator game did not consistently produce the Nash 
equilibrium of $10. This provides an opportunity to discuss why dictators may not extract the entire pie but leave 
some for the powerless responders. With about a quarter of the countries in the world considered “not free” by the 
Freedom House (2011), it provides the students a glimpse of how different economies and businesses may not 
operate with the freedoms seen in the Western countries.  
     Topic 2:  How much will the participant accept when given the choice? The homo economicus student will 
always accept any offer that includes at least one dollar. However, we can see from Table 4 below that students will 
reject $1 (100% of the time) in favor of receiving nothing.   
 
Table 4: Offers in the Small Pie Size Settings 
 
Amount of the  Proposer Demand Ultimatum Offers in Exercise 1 Rejection Rates Ultimatum Offers in Exercise 2 Rejection Rate 
0 1 0/1(0%) 0 N/A 
2 0 N/A 1 0/1 (0%) 
3 0 N/A 2 0/2 (0%) 
4 0 N/A 3 0/3 (0%) 
5 105 2/105 (1.9%) 86 0/86 (0%) 
6 5 2/5 (40%) 22 8/22 (36%) 
7 6 2/6 (33%) 10 8/10 (80%) 
8 4 3/4 (75%) 3 1/2 (50%) 
9 3 3/3 (100%) 2 2/2 (1005) 
10 6 6/6(100%) 1 1/1 (100%) 
Total Offers 130 18/130 130 20/130 
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 The above table falls nicely into the following observations from experimental results (see Güth, Schmittberger, 
& Schwarze,1982; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Güth, 1995; Camerer & Thaler,1995; Roth, 1995; Falk & 
Fischbacher, 2006). Summarizing these studies, we see that using the small pie size set-up: 
 
1. Very few offers are below $5 
2. The Modal offer is between $5 and $6 
3. Offers above $8 are extremely rare 
4. Rejection Rates near $5 are close to 0% 
5. Rejection Rates above $8 are close to 100% 
  
The results lead into a discussion of fairness and perception of various types of offers made by the proposer.  
Forysthe, et al. (1994) discussed how offers may contain both fairness and strategic considerations. Why do 
proposers offer more than $1 originally? Is it because they believe (correctly) that $1 offers are summarily rejected 
and that the responder will only accept fair offers? Or do the proposers believe that the money should be split?  
Rabin (1993) found that positive altruism (helping classmates) and negative envy (punishing the intentions of 
others) allows a focus on a “fairness equilibrium” that is closer to a 50/50 split than the Nash equilibrium. With a 
“fairness equilibrium,” we can add “attributions” into the economic analysis. This leads to a discussion concerning 
an extension to the game, not performed in the exercises, involving effort by the proposer to determine the size of 
the pie. If the proposer has to work for the pie, then how do the proposer and responder react to an “earned” pie 
compared to a “found” pie? (see Hoffman & Spitzer,1982; Hoffman & Spitzer,1985; Keasy & Moon, 1996). 
Topic 3: In the Ultimatum Game, does pie size matter? Often, we face the issue of discussing different 
behaviors based on the wealth of businesses, individuals or countries. Do people with greater monetary resources 
(wealth) have different behavior? If we alter the wealth available for the proposer to split, does that have an impact 
on their distribution? If you have more to give, then are you more likely to give a greater percentage than if you have 
less to give? These questions allow us to investigate the decision making process for how people donate to charities, 
how countries allocate foreign aid, etc. In our exercise, we compared proposer demands when faced with a small pie 
and with those when faced with a larger pie. Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of the proposer demands of the pie 
for each exercise in the small and large pie rounds. 
 




From Figure 1 and Table 5, we can see small pie and large pie proposer demands were approximately equal.  
Using a two tailed t-test, we found that the differences were not significantly different from each other at the 10% 
level. We observe that the offers were slightly greater than the 50/50 split.  Some students may point out, like early 
ultimatum game critics, that the pie size is too small and does not reflect the decision made if the pie size was 
increased. Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1997) found similar results to the stylized facts and outcomes in Table 5 that 
increasing the pie size does not affect the responder’s decision to reject or accept an offer.  
  
Table 5: Percentage of Small and Large Pie Demanded by Proposer in Exercise 2 
 
 Small Pie Percentage Large Pie Percentage Difference T –value 
Exercise 1 55.08% 53.61% 1.46% 1.37 
Exercise 2 54.15% 53.85% 0.03% 0.40 
Total 54.62% 53.73% 0.88% 1.34 
 
Topic 4: Does a relationship between the players impact the offer? To begin the discussion, we look at the 
relationship between proposers and responders. In the second exercise, we allowed different pairings of students.   In 
the first 10 rounds, students were randomly matched while in the next ten rounds they had fixed opponents. The 
students had a causal relationship during the fixed part of the exercise. They had the same partners but they were not 
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relationship exists between the players, are they more likely to play fairly, and if so, why? In other words, when 
playing against the same partner repeatedly, did proposers offer more equitable splits? If so, was it because 
responders could efficiently influence proposer’s demands by rejecting lower offers?    
 Figure 2 illustrates the difference that even a very casual relationship had on proposer demands. It graphs 
proposer demands for large pie treatments by method of opponent pairing either random or fixed pairings. The line 
shows each proposers average offers based on either the random or the fixed effect.   
 




From Table 6, the overall mean proposer demand for the random and fixed pairings was 10.77 and 10.09 
respectively. The difference between the random and fixed pairing was $0.63 or 3.15% of the pie and was 
significant at the 1% level. This finding supports the idea that a longer-term interaction or relationship, regardless of 
how loosely it is defined, may increase the level of fair play engaged in by the players.    
 
Table 6: Proposer Demands for Random and Fixed Treatments in Exercise 2 
 
Mean Proposer Demand 
Random Treatment 
Mean Proposer Demand 
Fixed Treatment 
t-value Observations 
10.77 10.09 5.44 130 
 
 Research has focused on how the question is framed and how the perceived relationship between the proposer 
and respondent impacts the level of fairness. Hoffman, et al. (1994) and Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1997) found 
that participants may expect future interactions with their partners, which may affect their decisions. While students 
in the classroom had no idea which classmate they were playing against, they may have expected future interactions 
with the pool of students as a whole, which may have influenced their decisions. This brings up the topic of how 
pricing decisions may differ in repeated situations (long-time customers) versus one-time transactions that occur in 
situations such as tourist destinations, which can easily fit into marketing discussions. In addition, cultural 
differences may enter into the discussion with different countries having different views and behaviors in various 
settings. Roth & Erev (1995) ran the ultimatum game across four different countries, USA, Japan, Israel and 
Slovenia, and found little difference in the modal accepted offers. The offers typically ranged from $4 to $5 with 
participants of Israel closer to $6.   
  The discussion following the game causes student to often wonder if there are moderating variables such as 
gender, age and/or socioeconomic conditions that may explain the outcomes. The benefit of this exercise is that 
those variables have been eliminated as possible explanatory variables (Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996). This 




 For instructors in all fields of business, not just economics, the Ultimatum game is an easy-to-use tool to explore 
the topic of fairness in the classroom. The basics of the game are simple for students to understand, yet the game 
allows for complex discussion of how fairness plays a role that may move results away from the homo economicus 
assumptions. This paper provides a guideline to an exercise that most students find rewarding and engaging in the 
discovery of not only economic principles, but also human behavior in a variety of business settings.  
 The ultimatum game illustrates that rationality is not always the motivation for behavior. Hoffman, et al. (1994) 
and Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1996) found that people do not always act simply to maximize their own payoffs, 
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everyday life. However, that is not to say that people do not behave in their own self interests. It simply means that 
purely rational behavior may not be the only factor influencing self-interest.   
As experiential learning plays a greater role in the classroom, an exercise like the ultimatum game gives 
instructors another technique to introduce and encourage discussion in the classroom. It allows exploration on the 
weights that individuals assign to fairness and equality. We all play the ultimatum game every day, whether we 
realize it or not. Each time we leave a restaurant, we play the dictator treatment of the game when deciding how to 
tip the servers. We may have even played the standard ultimatum treatment when deciding how to split the bill 
among our dinner companions. Thus, utilizing the tools of bargaining games like the ultimatum game will give 
students a view of the world that may be more memorable and a means of applying an understanding of decision 
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